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INSURANCE AND THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE:  
AN INFLUENTIAL OR IRRELEVANT PERSUADER? 
 
 
TRACEY CARVER* 
 
 
This article examines, from both within and outside the context of compulsory 
third party motor vehicle insurance, the different academic and judicial 
perspectives regarding the relevance of insurance to the imposition of 
negligence liability via the formulation of legal principle.  In particular, the 
utility of insurance in setting the standard of care held owing by a learner 
driver to an instructor in Imbree v McNeilly is analysed and the implications 
of this High Court decision, in light of current jurisprudential argument and 
for other principles of negligence liability, namely claimant vulnerability, are 
considered. It concludes that ultimately one’s stance as to the relevance, or 
otherwise, of insurance to the development of the common law of negligence 
will be predominately influenced by normative views of torts’ function as an 
instrument of corrective or distributive justice. 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
It is today undeniable that insurance, whether first or third party and whether 
compulsory or voluntary, forms an important part of the social fabric in which we live.  
Indeed, the reality is that insurance practices in many cases dictate who is sued in 
relation to negligence liability.  For example, the existence of mandatory third party 
motor vehicle insurance, and its consequent assurance of a defendant’s capacity to 
meet any damages award, has led to a greater incidence of personal injury claims in 
this area.1  Good samaritan legislation, whilst exempting volunteers from civil liability for 
injury caused in providing emergency assistance, is also subject to an exception where 
liability ‘falls within the ambit of a scheme of compulsory third party motor vehicle 
insurance’.2   
 
The ability of insurance practice to explain certain legislative provisions, in relation to 
general negligence liability, is also illustrated by the Civil Liability Acts,3 whose 
enactment was influenced by concerns about the availability and affordability of 
                                            
* BBus(Accy)(Dist), LLB(Hons) (QUT); LLM (Cantab). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology.  This article develops the author’s previously published work in ‘Vulnerability, Insurance and Policy: 
The Learner Driver’s Standard of Care’ (2009) 16 (1) eLaw Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
6.   
1 Hon JJ Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 432 at 
437-8; PS Atiyah, The Damages Lottery, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997, pp 101-2; R Lewis, ‘Insurance and the Tort 
System’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 85 at 90-1; J Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ (1995) 58 Modern Law 
Review 820 at 825-6; H Luntz et al, Torts: Cases and Commentary, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 6th ed, 
2009, pp 9-10, 16. 
2 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 5; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 74.  Similarly, the Congenital Disabilities 
(Civil Liability) Act 1976 (UK) provides that a child born disabled due to prenatal injury may not sue their mother, 
unless the disability is caused by the mother’s negligent driving of a motor vehicle: ss 1(1), 2. 
3 See, eg, Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); 
Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), referred to collectively as the Civil Liability Acts. 
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insurance (particularly in the public liability and professional indemnity insurance 
sectors).4  Nevertheless, in a post Civil Liability Act environment, whilst the ability of 
insurance, or perhaps more aptly the insurance industry,5 to influence tort reform and 
the formation and development of resultant legislation is apparent, the relevance of 
insurance to the judicial formulation of legal principle is still rarely acknowledged.6  
However, with respect to the law of negligence, Spigelman CJ has commented that: 
 
There seems little doubt that the attitude of judges has been determined to a very 
substantial extent by the assumption, almost always correct, that a defendant is 
insured ... Judges may have proven more reluctant to make findings of 
negligence, if they knew that the consequence was likely to be to bankrupt the 
defendant.7 
 
This article examines, from both within and outside the context of compulsory third party 
motor vehicle insurance, the different academic and judicial perspectives regarding 
whether or not, and why, insurance ought to be acknowledged as relevant to the 
formation of legal principle in the common law of negligence.  In particular, the utility of 
insurance in setting the standard of care found owing by a learner driver to their 
instructor in Imbree v McNeilly8 is analysed.  Finally, the implications of this High Court 
decision, regarding the significance of insurance to the judicial development of 
negligence law, are considered.  This occurs both generally and in light of current 
jurisprudential argument concerning the function of the law of negligence as a vehicle of 
corrective or distributive justice; and more specifically, in terms of insurance’s relevance 
to a principle of negligence liability other than standard of care, namely the emerging 
notion of claimant vulnerability.  
 
 
II THE RELEVANCE OF INSURANCE GENERALLY TO NEGLIGENCE 
PRINCIPLE:  DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES9 
 
Academic and judicial perspectives on the relevance of insurance to the formation of 
common law principle, and the determination of negligence law, traditionally fall within 
one of two broad positions: the irrelevance view or the influence view.  These are 
discussed below. 
                                            
4 ‘The rapid escalation of insurance premiums has brought into sharp focus the need for reform of the law of 
negligence’: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 March 2003, p 366 (RJ Welford).  See 
also P Vines, ‘Tort Reform, Insurance and Responsibility’ (2002) 25(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
842 at 842-3; Trowbridge Consulting, Public Liability Insurance Practical Proposals for Reform: Report to the 
Insurance Issues Working Group of Heads of Treasuries (30 May 2002) Australian Government Treasury, p i 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/314/PDF/plr.pdf>.   
5 Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’, above n 1, at 434, 439-40. 
6 Hon CJ McLure, ‘Risk and Responsibility: The Interplay Between Insurance and Tort Law’ (2002) 29(9) Brief 7 at 
10.  Her Honour states that it is for this reason that insurance is described as the ‘hidden or unconscious persuader’.  
See, eg, JG Fleming, The Law of Torts, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 9th ed, 1998, p 13.  See also M Mills, 
‘Insurance and Professional Liability – The Trend of Uncertainty Or: Negligence and the High Court – A 
Practitioner’s Perspective’ (2000) 12 Insurance Law Journal 25 at 26; Lewis, above n 1, at 96, 103; Vines, above n 
4, at 843. 
7 Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’, above n 1, at 433.  See also JJ Spigelman, 
‘Negligence and Insurance Premiums:  Recent Changes in Australian Law’ (2003) 11(3) Torts Law Journal 1 at 5; 
Hon JJ Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: An Overview’ (2006) 14 Tort Law Review 5 at 6. 
8 (2008) 236 CLR 510; [2008] HCA 40 (‘Imbree’). 
9 For further consideration of the relevance, or otherwise, of insurance to the development of tortious liability 
generally see Vines, above n 4; Imbree, above n 8, at [107]-[112], [128]-[179] (Kirby J). 
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A Insurance Irrelevant 
 
Conventionally, the existence or availability of first or third party insurance has been 
deemed irrelevant to the imposition of negligence liability through the formulation of 
legal principle (the irrelevance view).10  For example, in Davie v New Merton Board Mills 
Ltd, Viscount Simonds, in considering an employer’s duty to provide proper plant and 
equipment, argued that the probability that ‘the employer would, but the workman would 
not, be covered by insurance’ should not be given ‘any weight at all in [a] determination 
of the rights and obligations of the parties’,11 decreeing:  
 
It is not the function of a court of law to fasten upon the fortuitous circumstance of 
insurance to impose a greater burden on the employer than would otherwise lie 
upon him.12  
 
More recently, the irrelevance of insurance to the scope and content of negligence law 
was affirmed by Gummow J in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council.  Here, in deciding whether 
the duty of care owed by a public authority occupier included an obligation to warn of 
the dangers of diving into water of variable depth, his Honour held that the fact that as 
‘opposed to public authorities are “vulnerable victims” unlikely to have protection from 
insurance against the risk of serious injury in recreational pursuits, should not skew 
consideration of the legal issues’.13 
 
In third party or liability insurance, a private contract of indemnity exists between the 
policy holder and the insurance provider, under which the insurer undertakes to protect 
the insured against loss stemming from their own legal liability.14  It therefore protects 
the insured ‘against having to pay money to someone else’.15  Consequently, the 
proponents of the irrelevance view, in the context of third party insurance, argue that as 
such questions of indemnity arise only after a defendant’s, or insured’s, negligence 
liability has been determined; the presence of insurance is irrelevant to the formation of 
legal obligation.  Alternatively, this position has also been justified on the basis that as 
‘tort liability cannot be predicated on the means of the defendant’,16 their ‘ability to 
satisfy a debt [via insurance] is not a relevant enquiry until such debt is proven to 
exist’.17   
 
                                            
10 J Fleming, ‘Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance’ (1947-1948) 57 The Yale Law 
Journal 549 at 551; J Edelman and S Degeling, ‘The Future of the Common Law of Torts’ (2010)  33 Australian 
Bar Review 45 at 51.  Proponents of this view, in addition to those referenced below, include Stapleton, ‘Tort, 
Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 820, 823-4, 826-8, 830, 833, 843; J Stapleton, ‘Private Law and Institutional 
Competition’ (1999) 9(3) Otago Law Review 519 at 531; Lord Diplock, ‘Judicial Development of Law in the 
Commonwealth’ in Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth Commonwealth Law Conference (1977) 493 at 499; Perre v 
Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 230 (McHugh J) (‘Perre’); WD & HO Wills (Australia) Ltd v State Rail Authority of 
New South Wales (1998) 43 NSWLR 338 at 352-3 (Mason P) (‘Wills’). 
11 [1959] AC 604 at 626-7. 
12 Ibid at 627.  
13 (2005) 223 CLR 422; [2005] HCA 62 at [53] (‘Vairy’). 
14 Fleming, ‘Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance’, above n 10, at 551; MA Jones, A 
Textbook on Torts, Blackstone Press Limited, Great Britain, 1986, pp 6-7.  
15 C Sappideen et al, Torts: Commentary and Materials, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 10th ed, 2009, p 10. 
16 Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v Dobson [1999] 2 SCR 753 at 801 (L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ) 
(‘Dobson’).   
17 M Duffy, ‘Disclosure by Defendants of their Insurance Details: Elephant in the Court-Room for Tort and Other 
Claims’ (2010) 18 Torts Law Journal 257 at 278. 
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In first party insurance, the insurer contracts to pay money to the insured themself upon 
the occurrence of a particular event or loss.18  However, because the benefit of this type 
of insurance is generally paid regardless of liability or fault, whilst it is also historically 
disregarded in the development of common law rules, this has occurred on different 
grounds.  Namely that, as a matter of principle, defendants should not be advantaged 
by insurance taken out by a plaintiff for their own benefit.  Accordingly, in Lister v 
Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Viscount Simonds also stated:19 
 
It is urged that it must be irrelevant to the right of the master to sue his servant 
for breach of duty that the master is insured against its consequences: as a 
general proposition it has not, I think, been questioned for nearly 200 years that 
in determining the rights inter se of A and B the fact that one or other of them is 
insured is to be disregarded ... I cannot wholly ignore a principle so widely 
applicable as that a man insures at his own expense for his own benefit and does 
not thereby suffer any derogation of his rights against another man.20 
 
Consequently, on this basis a defendant’s negligence liability will not normally be 
reduced by the proceeds of a plaintiff’s, or in a wrongful death action a deceased’s, own 
private insurance.21  In Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad”, 
Stephen J, in finding that a duty of care was owed, similarly rejected the contention that 
a plaintiff’s ability to bear the loss via insurance was a valid consideration denying 
recovery for pure economic loss.  Rather, he considered that it was ‘just and fair that a 
negligent tortfeasor ... should be found liable to compensate the sufferer of the loss 
rather than that the victim should bear it’22 themself. 
 
B Insurance Influential 
 
In Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie it was acknowledged that: 
 
The shift towards imposing reasonable obligations to promote the safety of those 
to whom a duty of care is owed may possibly be traced to growing levels of 
community education and awareness of the enormous size of the problem of 
accidents and the toll which such accidents take upon those who suffer as a 
consequence.  It is difficult to deny that statutory schemes of compulsory 
insurance and the widespread availability of the facility of private insurance have 
affected the attitudes of the courts towards the development of this branch of the 
law.23 
 
                                            
18 See, eg, Sappideen et al, above n 15; Atiyah, above n 1, p 117. 
19 [1957] AC 555. 
20 Ibid at 576-7. 
21 See, eg, Bradburn v Great Western Railway Co (1874) LR 10 Ex 1; Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 23(a).  
Nevertheless, in a distinction criticised by Edelman and Degeling, above n 10, at 53, the damages payable have been 
reduced where the insurance premiums on the policy in question have not been paid by the plaintiff, but rather have 
been paid either by their employer (Pirelli General Plc v Gaca [2004] 3 All ER 348; [2004] EWCA Civ 373) or, in 
the case of a statutory insurance scheme financed by builder registration fees, not at all (Hamilton v 1214125 
Ontario Limited [2009] ONCA 684). 
22 (1976) 136 CLR 529 at 581 (‘Caltex’).  See also 580. Aff’d Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193 at 237 (McGarvie J) 
(‘Seale’).                                                                                                                                                                                                         
23 (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 at 518 (Kirby P) (in the context of an occupiers’ liability case).   
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Indeed, Davies argues24 that the very concept of the modern duty of care, in 
propounding that a duty should be owed to anyone within the risk foreseeably posed by 
a defendant’s conduct,25 ‘was shaped by the introduction of virtually unlimited liability 
insurance in the late nineteenth century’26 and its adoption of a similar sphere-of-risk 
approach in the calculation of premiums based upon a determination of the likelihood of 
a risk’s occurrence. 
 
Accordingly, although customarily ignored as irrelevant, there are those who consider 
that, particularly in today’s social climate,27 the general availability or affordability of 
insurance is influential in developing or shaping negligence principle (the influence 
view),28 and that ‘[o]nly the advent of insurance can explain the shift of community 
attitudes to accident prevention reflected in the decisions of the courts’.29  They argue 
that whilst such ‘considerations have not always been articulated’;30 they should be 
                                            
24 M Davies, ‘The End of the Affair: Duty of Care and Liability Insurance’ (1989) 9 Legal Studies 67 at 68-9, 76-80, 
82.  
25 See, eg, Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 at 509 (Brett MR): ‘Whenever one person is by circumstances 
placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he 
would cause danger or injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to 
avoid such danger’.  See also Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580-1 (Lord Atkin). 
26 Davies, above n 24, at 68. 
27 See further above n 1 and accompanying text. 
28 See, eg, P Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Butterworths, London, 6th ed, 1999, p 203; J 
Morgan, ‘Tort, Insurance and Incoherence’ (2004) 67(3) Modern Law Review 384 at 384-5, 392. Cf 400 (where 
Morgan questions whether insurance, whilst influential in the development of modern tort law, should be so in fact); 
S Deakin, A Johnston and B  Markesinis, Tort Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 6th ed, 2008, pp 14, 226; 
Fleming, The Law of Torts, above n 6, p 13; Fleming, ‘Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability 
Insurance’, above n 10; Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’, above n 1, at 433; 
Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: An Overview’, above n 7, at 6-7; Davies, above n 24, at 82; Mills, above n 6, at 26, 
35-6; Lewis, above n 1, at 94-5, 98, 116.  See also Esanda Finance Corporation Limited v Peat Marwick 
Hungerfords  (1996) 188 CLR 241 at 282-3, 285, 303 (McHugh J) (‘Esanda’) (availability and affordability of 
insurance relevant to determining whether auditors should owe a new duty of care to third party financiers acting in 
reliance upon audited accounts and reports); Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) 
(1981) 150 CLR 225 at 251-2 (Mason J) (liability for negligent misstatement extended beyond those carrying on a 
business or profession of providing information or advice, in part, due to ‘the availability of insurance as a 
protection against liability’); Northern Sandblasting Pty Limited v Harris (1997) 118 CLR 313 at 398, 402 (Kirby J) 
(‘Northern Sandblasting’) (relative availability of insurance cover, as between the parties, relevant to the existence, 
or otherwise, of a non-delegable duty of care owed by landlords for the acts of contractors); Sweeney v Boylan 
Nominees Pty Limited (2006) 226 CLR 161; [2006] HCA 19 at [106] (Kirby J) (vicarious liability should extend to 
the acts of independent contractors as it cannot be assumed that ‘most now have their own insurance or other means 
of bearing their separate liabilities’); Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; [2010] HCA 12 at [102] (Crennan J) (policy 
considerations relevant to rejecting the loss of a chance as actionable damage in a medical negligence case included: 
‘the prospect of thereby encouraging defensive medicine, the impact of that on the Medicare system and private 
medical insurance schemes and the impact of any change to the basis of liability on professional liability insurance 
of medical practitioners’); Parissis v Bourke [2004] NSWCA 373 at [9] (Tobias JA) (the likely increase in 
premiums on public liability insurance policies considered in determining that the host or occupier of a house did 
not owe a duty of care to supervise the alcohol-fuelled activities of party-goers); Moorabool Shire Council v 
Taitapanui (2006) 14 VR 55; [2006] VSCA 30 at [169], [182] (Ormiston and Ashley JJA) (the statutory requirement 
of compulsory professional indemnity insurance was ‘not without all relevance’ to a conclusion that a private 
surveyor owed a duty of care to the subsequent purchaser of a dwelling); Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356 
at 361 (King CJ) (‘Robertson’) (the difficulty of insuring against liability considered in determining the scope of a 
parent’s duty to supervise their child); Evans v Vowles [2003] EWCA Civ 318 at [12] (Lord Phillips MR) (‘Evans’) 
(‘the availability of insurance, both to players against the risk of injury and to referees against the risk of third party 
liability’ relevant to the policy question of whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on Welsh 
Rugby Union referees). 
29 Johnson v Johnson [1991] NSWCA 159 at 6 (Kirby P) (‘Johnson’).  
30 Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie, above n 23, at 518 (Kirby P).  See also Davies, above n 24, at 68, 82. 
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openly considered and weighed as part of the reasons informing the formulation, and 
consequent imposition, of negligence liability.31 Consequently, in Smith v Bush, in 
preventing a surveyor’s disclaimer of the duty of care owed to a property purchaser in 
relation to a negligent land valuation, in part, due to the surveyor’s ability to protect 
themself via liability insurance, Lord Griffiths stated: 
 
There was once a time when it was considered improper even to mention the 
possible existence of insurance cover in a lawsuit.  But those days are long past.  
Everyone knows that all prudent, professional men carry insurance, and the 
availability and cost of insurance must be a relevant factor when considering 
which of two parties should be required to bear the risk of a loss.32 
 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal has also accepted that ‘a person embarking 
upon an activity that provides exposure to (claims of) tortious liability will often be 
compelled to insure against the risk’ and ‘[j]udges cannot ignore this reality’.33   
 
Far from insurance being irrelevant to developing the rules of negligence liability, some 
cases have even indicated that an occupier’s failure to ensure that risks to entrants are 
insured against may itself be a tortious wrong.  For example, in Gwilliam v West 
Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust,34 the English Court of Appeal held that a hospital, as 
the organiser of a fair, owed a duty to take reasonable care in the provision of 
hazardous35 entertainment devices, which included an obligation to ascertain whether 
the contractors conducting such activities in hospital grounds had public liability 
insurance cover.  Although dissenting, Sedley LJ accepted that ‘the specific 
development of the law favoured by the majority ... recognis[ed] that in modern society 
the cushioning of imported risks by insurance is a form of care which an occupier ought 
reasonably to extend to a visitor’.36  In the Australian High Court, a similar view may be 
inferred from Kirby J’s dissenting judgment in Neindorf v Junkovic.  Here his Honour 
considers that, as opposed to ordinary occupiers or homeowners, 
 
                                            
31 Esanda, above n 28, at 282; Morgan, above n 28, at 385; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis, above n 28, p 14. 
32 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858 (‘Smith’).  See also 859.  Here the land valuation was funded by a mortgagor but was 
procured on behalf of and relied upon by a prospective mortgagee (the property purchaser). 
33 Kinzett v McCourt [1999] NSWCA 7 at [117] (Mason P).  See also [97] (Spigelman CJ).   
34 [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 at [7]-[17] (Lord Woolf CJ), [37]-[43] (Waller LJ) (‘Gwilliam’).  Lord Woolf CJ based 
his duty upon whether the hospital, as occupier, had delegated its duty to protect entrants from foreseeable risks of 
harm to a reasonably competent (by virtue of their insurance) contractor under section 2 of the Occupiers’ Liability 
Act 1957 (UK), whilst Waller LJ’s judgement was based upon a more self-contained duty to ensure that an 
independent contractor performing a hazardous activity was insured, or in a position to meet a claim.  On either 
view the duty was discharged as the defendant had inquired about the contractor’s insurance position and had 
contracted for that insurance to be in place. 
35 Cf Naylor (t/a Mainstreet) v Payling [2004] EWCA Civ 560 at [55]-[58] (Waller LJ) (‘Naylor’). 
36 Gwilliam, above n 34, at [54].  Cf Glaister v Appelby-In-Westmorland Town Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1325.  
Here a town council was not ‘under a duty of care to ensure that appropriate public liability insurance in respect of 
negligent acts or omissions by participants’ in a horse fair was in place: at [12].  This was because, whilst an 
occupier’s general duty of care extended to ensure that ‘visitors are reasonably safe from activities of a third person 
which the occupier permits to be carried out on his land’ (at [47]), here the Council neither owned nor occupied the 
land on which plaintiff’s accident occurred, or directed such fair activities.  Consequently, in these circumstances, as 
the Council did not owe a duty of care to prevent damage occurring due to the negligence of a third person, the 
Court of Appeal considered that a ‘free-standing duty of care to procure the placement of public liability insurance’ 
was ‘one stage more remote’ and therefore should not be owed: at [49].  See also [64].  In Naylor, there was no 
obligation to ensure that an independent contractor was insured (absent a statutory, or generally recognised, 
obligation upon the employer to insure) in circumstances where their competence could be ascertained through other 
means, namely a licensing system: above n 35, at [19]-[25] (Latham LJ), [34]-[54] (Neuberger LJ). 
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[t]hose who invite for economic gain can be expected, at the very least, to turn 
their attention to dangers that will be faced by those who accept their invitation.  
Moreover, realistically, they may be expected as a practical matter to turn their 
attention to securing insurance in order to provide indemnity in the event of 
accidents.37 
 
The influence of insurance upon tortious liability has not however been confined to 
liability insurance. Therefore, in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day, whilst ultimately 
imposing a duty upon a public authority to exercise its statutory powers to ensure that a 
defective fireplace was repaired, in determining whether such duty was ‘fair, just and 
reasonable’ on balance, Kirby J considered the plaintiffs’ ability, as premises owners 
and occupiers, to protect themselves from the risk of fire through first party insurance.38  
A plaintiff’s obligation to procure first party home insurance was however used as one 
reason for denying a council’s negligence liability for property damage caused by 
squatters in Lamb v Camden London Borough Council.39  After having regard to the fact 
that it was commonplace ‘for the courts, when considering policy, to take insurance into 
account’,40 Lord Denning stated that: 
 
Looking at the question as one of policy, I ask myself: whose job was it to do 
something to keep out the squatters?  And, if they got in, to evict them?  To my 
mind the answer is clear.  It was the job of the owner of the house, Mrs Lamb ... 
No one ever wrote to the council asking them to do it.  The council were not in 
occupation of the house.  They had no right to enter it ... it seems to me that if 
Mrs Lamb was insured against damage to the house and theft, the insurers 
should pay the loss.  If she was not insured, that is her misfortune.41 
 
Nevertheless, whilst proponents of the influence view advocate the relevance of 
insurance to legal reasoning and the development of negligence law, cases such as 
Smith,42 Pyrenees43 and Lamb44 illustrate that the availability of insurance only provides 
an additional or supplementary reason45 for, or against, the extension of negligence 
liability.  Its presence alone neither dictates a defendant’s common law liability, nor gives 
rise to strict liability.46  Rather, its sphere of impact remains influential rather than 
instrumental – otherwise how could one explain cases such as Pyrenees where liability 
was found despite the plaintiff’s ability to insure?47  It is also ‘by no means true, even in 
cases such as road accident cases, where liability insurance is compulsory, that the fact 
                                            
37 (2005) 222 ALR 631; [2005] HCA 75 at [65] (‘Neindorf’).  See also [76], [87].  
38 (1998)192 CLR 330; [1998] HCA 3 at [253] (‘Pyrenees’). 
39 [1981] QB 625 (‘Lamb’). 
40 Ibid at 638. 
41 Ibid at 637-8. The scope of the council’s negligence liability in causing the subsidence of a house therefore did not 
extend to the damage subsequently caused by squatters whilst the house was vacated pending repair. 
42 Above n 32. 
43 Above n 38. 
44 Above n 39. 
45 Luntz et al, above n 1, p 24. 
46 Nevertheless some statutory schemes, to the exclusion of common law liability, do impose a system of 
compulsory contributions or insurance in combination with strict liability, or no-fault compensation, for death or 
injury occurring in, or as a result of, a motor vehicle accident.  See, eg Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 
(NT). 
47 ‘Owners and occupiers of property commonly do, and should, protect themselves, including by fire insurance’: 
Pyrenees, above n 38, at [253] (Kirby J). 
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that the defendant is insured guarantees the plaintiff success’.48  For example, in Smith 
v Jenkins, in finding that the plaintiff’s participation in a crime prevented him from 
recovering damages in relation to the defendant’s negligent driving of a stolen motor 
vehicle, Windeyer J acknowledged that the trial judge’s reference49 to the existence of 
compulsory insurance was ‘a relevant consideration of public policy supporting the 
conclusion that the plaintiff should receive compensation for his injuries’.50  
Nevertheless, he remarked that ‘[i]f his Honour meant that the policy and purpose of 
statutory obligations of insurance against motor vehicle accidents can determine 
common law liabilities, I agree that this would have been a mistake’.51 
 
 
III THE RELEVANCE OF COMPULSORY THIRD PARTY MOTOR VEHICLE 
INSURANCE 
 
The same broad positions, in terms of acknowledging the role of insurance in the 
formulation of negligence law, are therefore evident in motor vehicle accident cases 
where compulsory third party insurance is present.   On the one hand, some cases 
display a similar rejection of the utility of insurance, or an adoption of the irrelevance 
view.  For example, according to the Australian High Court in Kars v Kars, ‘whilst 
insurance, including compulsory statutory insurance, is an extremely important feature 
of the social environment in which tort litigation occurs’,52 the indemnity provided by 
liability insurance is ‘irrelevant to the legal liability which pre-existed it and should not be 
permitted to distort it’.53  As a result, although the existence of compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance was used in this case to contradict an argument raised by the appellant as 
‘resting on a manifestly false premise of fact’,54 it was given no weight ‘in resolving the 
issue of whether a care-giver’s status as tortfeasor required, in law, the exclusion of 
such care in computing the injured person’s entitlement to recovery’.55  In Dobson 
(Litigation Guardian of) v Dobson, the Supreme Court of Canada, also deemed 
insurance irrelevant to tortious liability.56  It held that if the existence of compulsory third 
party insurance was ‘to be relied upon as the basis for imposing a duty of care upon a 
pregnant woman’57 to a subsequently born child for prenatal injury caused by negligent 
driving, ‘then this solution should be enacted by the legislature.  A specific and 
                                            
48 Cane, above n 28, p 204.  See also Rawson v Clark (Unreported, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Cumming-
Bruce, Brandon and O’Connor LJJ, 16 October 1980).  
49 Jenkins v Smith [1969] VR 267 at 276 (Starke J). 
50 Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397 at 409.  Cf Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438 at 464 (Murphy J), 
where insurance was considered irrelevant in similar circumstances. 
51 Smith v Jenkins, above n 50, (Windeyer J). 
52 (1996) 187 CLR 354 at 378 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) (‘Kars’).  
53 Ibid.  See also Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 6, 11-12 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron 
JJ); Launchbury v Morgans [1971] 2 QB 245 at 263 (Megaw LJ) (‘Launchbury’). 
54 Kars, above n 52, at 382 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).  Here the appellant had argued that the 
claimant should not receive Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 damages on account of gratuitous care 
provided to them by the appellant, in part, on the basis that the appellant (as tortfeasor) would then pay twice: once 
by providing the care and again via the “personal” payment of damages: at 377.  However, in reality, the context of 
the decision, arising out of the negligent driving of a motor vehicle, meant that this argument could not succeed.  
This was because the existence of compulsory insurance, by removing the tortfeasor’s own burden to pay damages, 
ensured ‘that the source of the provision of services [was] not identical to the source of the plaintiff’s recovery’: at 
382.   
55 Kars, above n 52, at 378.  Instead, this issue was resolved on other grounds: see below n 133. 
56 Above n 16, at 796 (Lamer CJ, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Binnie JJ).  See also 783-4, 791, 
794-5, 798. 
57 Ibid at 784. 
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insurance-dependant role of tort liability cannot, and should not, be created by the 
courts’.58 
 
However, increasingly the influence view, or the ability of compulsory third party 
insurance to shape negligence principle, has been acknowledged.  Consequently, in 
contrast to Dobson, the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Lynch v 
Lynch59 was ‘predicated, in large part, on the existence of a mandatory insurance 
regime for automobile negligence’.60  Here, the court concluded that as the regime ‘was 
introduced to ensure that persons who were injured as a result of the negligent driving 
of vehicles were properly compensated and that their claims were not open to be 
defeated by the impecuniosity of the defendant’,61 it was ‘difficult to find any policy 
considerations in favour of denying compensation to a child whose disabilities flow[ed] 
from ante-natal injuries received in a motor vehicle accident’62 due to the negligence of 
the child’s mother.63  A similarly insurance-dependant rationale was adopted in, Avram v 
Gusakoski where Murray AJA observed that complete defences, in road accident cases, 
are ‘less attractive conceptually’ where compulsory third party insurance is universal.64 
 
In some instances, the doctrine of vicarious liability has also been extended, on the 
basis of compulsory third party insurance, so as to make a vehicle owner liable, not only 
for personal injury caused by the driving of a servant within the course of their 
employment, but also for the acts of one driving a car as agent for the owner’s purpose 
and within their control.65  The judiciary’s approach in this area was confirmed by Lord 
Denning MR in Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council, who noted that it was 
because the car owner was insured that judges thought they should bear the loss.66  
Consequently, in Scott v Davis, the High Court’s refusal to further extend this principle 
to the flying of aircraft, was justified by Gummow J on the basis that at the time of the 
accident ‘there was no statutory requirement for compulsory third party insurance by 
owners in respect of non-commercial flights ... In the absence of such a requirement, it 
is difficult to impose absolute liability upon a person such as Mr Davis’.67 
 
These general perspectives on the effect of insurance will now be considered more 
closely in the context of the High Court’s decision in Imbree v McNeilly. 
  
                                            
58 Ibid.  See also Kars, above n 52, at 379 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
59 (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 (‘Lynch’). 
60 Dobson, above n 16, at 795.  See also Atiyah, above n 1, p 68. 
61 Lynch, above n 59, at 416 (Clarke JA).  See also Jenkins v Smith [1969] VR 267 at 276 (Starke J); Morgan, above 
n 28, at 384-5; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis, above n 28, pp 226, 229. 
62 Lynch, above n 59, at 416 (Clarke JA).   
63 Consequently (and contrary to Kars, above n 52-55 and accompanying text), the existence of compulsory motor 
vehicle insurance was also given weight, in this case, in finding that a care-giver’s, or mother’s, status as defendant 
should not be used to deny the claimant Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 compensation on the basis that 
the mother would then pay twice: ibid at 418-20. 
64 (2006) 31 WAR 4000; [2006] WASCA 16 at [67]. 
65 Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215. 
66 [1972] 1 QB 373 at 397.  See also Launchbury, above n 53, at 253-5 (Lord Denning MR), 260 (Edmund Davies 
LJ).  ‘It is true that the master or principal is not personally at fault.  But it is only right that he should be made 
vicariously liable.  Otherwise it would mean that the injured person would get no redress; for, more often than not, 
the servant or agent has not the means to pay: whereas his master or principal has the means: or, at any rate, ought to 
insure against the liability so as to get the means to pay’: at 253-4 (Lord Denning MR). 
67 (2000) 204 CLR 333; [2000] HCA 52 at [254].    
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IV THE UTILITY OF INSURANCE IN IMBREE V MCNEILLY 
 
In Imbree v McNeilly, the claimant sustained tetraplegia after the defendant swerved off 
a gravel road to avoid some tyre debris and overturned the four-wheel drive station 
wagon in which they were travelling.  Although knowing that he had no learner’s permit 
and little driving experience, Imbree permitted McNeilly to drive under his supervision.  
The case, therefore, required an examination of the standard of reasonable care that a 
learner driver ought to owe an instructing passenger in negligence. 
 
Before Imbree, in relation to “ordinary” passengers68 and road users,69 learner drivers 
owed a duty to exhibit the same degree of skill and care whilst driving that might 
reasonably be expected from an experienced and competent driver.  However, Cook v 
Cook stood for the proposition that, because the absence of skill or experience 
explained the instruction or supervision undertaken, the standard of reasonable care 
owed by a learner driver to an “instructing or supervising” passenger, conscious of the 
driver’s inexperience, was lower.70 Instead, only the standard of an ‘unqualified and 
inexperienced driver’71 was required. 
 
Notwithstanding Cook, a 6:1 majority72 of the Australian High Court in Imbree held that 
the translation of an instructor’s knowledge of a driver’s inexperience ‘into the 
identification of a separate category or class of relationship governed by a distinct and 
different duty [or a reduced standard] of care’73 could no longer be sustained.  Rather, 
the court adopted a single, universal, and objective standard – of the hypothetical 
reasonable or competent driver – which it applied to all drivers, irrespective of their 
status or relationship with the claimant. 74  
 
A number of factors justified the court’s departure from its previous jurisprudence,75 
including: 
                                            
68 Cook v Cook (1986) 161 CLR 376 at 382-3 (‘Cook’); Radford v Ward (1990) 11 MVR 509 at 514 (‘Radford’). 
69 Cook, above n 68, at 384.  See also Ricketts v Laws (1988) 14 NSWLR 311 at 322 (‘Ricketts’); Imbree, above n 8, 
at [17], [20], [53]. 
70 Cook, above n 68, at 378-9, 388 (Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ), 391-4 (Brennan J).  See also Radford, 
above n 68, at 514. 
71 Cook, above n 68, at 384, 388 (Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ).  Brennan J similarly expressed the 
standard as that of an ‘inexperienced driver of ordinary prudence’: at 394. 
72 Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ gave a joint judgement with which Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kirby JJ individually 
agreed: Imbree, above n 8, at [1] (Gleeson CJ), [193] (Crennan J), [105], [180] (Kirby J).  Heydon J dissented. 
73 Ibid at [50] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
74 Ibid at [27], [54], [72] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ), [103], [105], [110], [125] (Kirby J).  The court held that 
this standard of care had been breached: at [24] (Gleeson CJ), [88]-[89] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ), [105], 
[183] (Kirby J), [186], [192] (Heydon J), [193] (Crennan J).  However Imbree was 30 percent contributory negligent 
in failing to: instruct McNeilly to straddle the tyre debris; and offer ‘basic advice to a learner driver to make no 
sudden change of direction or speed on a dirt road’: at [96] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ).  See also [90]-[95] 
(Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ), [105], [183] (Kirby J). 
75 Ibid at [13] (Gleeson CJ), [27], [51], [71]-[72] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ), [105], [181]-[182] (Kirby J), 
[191] (Crennan J).  Heydon J held that the case could be decided without overruling Cook.  This was because, as he 
had been careless over the mere inexperience of a learner, McNeilly’s duty of care had been breached on either view 
of the standard of care owed (whether it was the standard of an ‘unqualified and inexperienced’ driver or the higher 
standard of an ‘experienced and competent’ driver): at [185]-[186]. Additionally, it was not submitted that the trial 
judge’s acceptance of Cook ‘had led him to select too high a percentage for contributory negligence’ (given that 
apportionment of liability on account of contributory negligence is measured by reference to the relative culpability 
of the parties assessed in light of the degree of departure from the standard of care owed by each): at [187]-[191]. Cf 
[95]-[96] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
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 the difficulty, ‘given the wide variability in degrees of inexperience’, in defining any 
lower standard expected from a learner;76  
 concern that the continued recognition of a special standard of care in the case of 
learner drivers would detract from the objective standard traditionally required by 
the law of negligence;77 
 the unpredictability, incoherence78 and injustice of a learner driver owing different 
standards of care in relation to the same activity depending upon whether the 
plaintiff: was an ordinary passenger, a supervising passenger, or another road user; 
or had knowledge of the driver’s inexperience;79 and   
 the learner’s control over the driving and the instructor’s corresponding 
vulnerability.80 
 
However, in determining the standard of care which ought to be owed, Gleeson CJ 
(with whom Crennan J agreed)81 and Kirby J also considered the relevance of 
insurance and the policy underpinning such mandatory schemes for automobile 
negligence.  In doing so, their judgements purportedly82 reflect the broad divergence of 
views discussed above. 
 
A The Influence View: Kirby J 
 
Whilst agreeing that Cook’s principle should be overruled, Kirby J found the presence 
of a compulsory statutory scheme of third party motor vehicle insurance across 
Australia ‘material to defining the content and standard of the duty of care owed’.83  In 
this context, his Honour referred84 to the English Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Nettleship v Weston, where, in similarly holding a driver’s learner status irrelevant to 
the standard of care required, Lord Denning MR stated that: 
 
Parliament requires every driver to be insured against third party risks.  The 
reason is so that a person injured by a motor car should not be left to bear the 
loss on his own, but should be compensated out of the insurance fund ... But the 
                                            
76 Imbree, above n 8, at [10] (Gleeson CJ).  See also [56]-[58] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ), [135], [180] (Kirby 
J).  In practice, the standard extended from that of an ‘almost totally inexperienced driver’, to the higher obligation 
of a driver, who in presenting for a driving examination, regarded themself as ‘ready to hold a motor driver’s 
licence’: George v Erickson (1998) 27 MVR 323 at 326-8 (Malcolm CJ). 
77 The ‘rejection of knowledge as a basis for applying a different standard of care’ was mandated ‘by the essential 
requirement that the standard of care be objective and impersonal’: Imbree, above n 8, at [55] (Gummow, Hayne 
and Kiefel JJ).  See also [9] (Gleeson CJ), [103] (Kirby J); Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448 at 457. 
78 The notion that the imposition of negligence liability should be consistent with other legal principles received 
particular attention in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; [2001] HCA 59 at [53]-[62]. 
79 Imbree, above n 8, at [5], [15]-[19] (Gleeson CJ), [49], [53]-[55], [69]-[70] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ), 
[135], [142], [180] (Kirby J).  For example, one passenger ‘may know that the learner driver is a mere novice.  
Another passenger may believe him to be entirely competent ... Is the one passenger to recover and the other not?’: 
Nettleship v Weston [1971] QB 691 at 700 (Lord Denning MR) (‘Nettleship’). 
80 Imbree, above n 8, at [4], [17] (Gleeson CJ), [59]-[60], [66]-[68] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ).  See also T 
Carver, ‘Vulnerability, Insurance and Policy: The Learner Driver’s Standard of Care’ (2009) 16 (1) eLaw Journal: 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 6 at 19-23.  The concept of vulnerability is discussed further at 
below n 170 and accompanying text. 
81 Imbree, above n 8, at [193]. 
82 However see discussion at below n 118-121 and accompanying text. 
83 Imbree, above n 8, at [107].  See also [106]-[112], [130]-[138], [143]-[182].                                         
84 Ibid at [107], [132]-[136], [138], [180]. 
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injured person is only able to recover if the driver is liable in law.  So the judges 
see to it that he is liable, unless he can prove care and skill of a high standard.85 
 
Consequently, and reflective also of Clarke JA in Lynch,86 Kirby J likewise discerned, in 
the Australian compulsory insurance scheme, a policy of compensating accident 
victims87 which rendered ‘an elimination, or qualification, of a duty of care in such 
circumstances unrealistic’.88  Instead, it provided a reason ‘of the greatest practicality 
and importance’89 for imposing upon a learner, in the driving instructor’s favour, the 
higher standard of an ordinary ‘reasonable driver’.90   According to his Honour, this was 
because whilst Cook’s principle ‘defeat[ed] the large social purposes that lay behind the 
enactment of compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance’,91 a standard unrestricted 
by an instructor’s knowledge of the driver’s inexperience, increased the likelihood of the 
imposition of negligence liability and through it, compensation. 
     
The influence of insurance upon the standard owed by the driver of a motor vehicle to 
others, had previously been acknowledged by Kirby J, whilst President of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal, in Johnson v Johnson.  Here his Honour stated that there 
was ‘little doubt that what today is regarded as breach of the standard of reasonable 
care has been affected by the advent of widespread insurance, including compulsory 
insurance in industrial accident and motor vehicle injury cases’.92  However, whilst 
renowned for championing the relevance of insurance generally to tortious liability in a 
variety of contexts (including the scope of the duty of care owed by: occupiers;93 public 
authorities;94 landlords95 and quasi-employers96), Kirby J’s view has not always been 
consistent.  For example, in Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd his Honour opined that an 
occupier’s duty ‘is not related to, nor does it vary with, the likelihood of insurance 
providing indemnity against liability’.97  Nevertheless, according to Kirby J, giving 
express weight to the relevance of insurance in the formulation of tort principle in 
Imbree, corresponded ‘with a growing preparedness of the courts to acknowledge the 
influence of insurance ... in defining the content of legal liability’,98 at least where it was 
compulsory and universal.99 
 
  
                                            
85 Above n 79, at 699-700. Cf Salmon LJ who stated that civil law duties are not ‘affected by whether or not the 
driver is insured’: at 703.  See also Cook, above n 68, at 385 (Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ): The approach 
depicted by Lord Denning MR ‘is not one which should be adopted’.  Nevertheless, the availability of compulsory 
third party motor vehicle insurance was central to his Lordship’s determination of the scope of negligence liability 
in Nettleship: Cane, above n 28, p 203.  Cf Imbree, above n 8, at [15]-[19] (Gleeson CJ). 
86 Discussed at above n 59 and accompanying text. 
87 Imbree, above n 8, at [171], [179].  See also Ricketts, above n 69, at 315, 319 (Kirby P). 
88 Imbree, above n 8, at [143]. 
89 Ibid at [138]. 
90 Ibid at [182]. 
91 Ibid at [143]. 
92 Johnson, above n 29, at 6 (Kirby P). 
93 See, eg, Neindorf, above n 37; Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie, above n 23. 
94 See, eg, Pyrenees, above n 38. 
95 See, eg, Northern Sandblasting, above n 28. 
96 See, eg, Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Limited, above n 28. 
97 (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 at 245-6.  See also Kars, above n 52, at 378-9, 381-2 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and 
Kirby JJ). 
98 Imbree, above n 8, at [108].  See also [107], [169]. 
99 Ibid at [107]-[108], [157], [181].  See also Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 
70 at [80], [82] (Kirby J). 
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B The Irrelevance View: Gleeson CJ 
 
A more conservative approach, however, was adopted by Gleeson CJ.  In contrast to 
Kirby J, his Honour considered that the statutory scheme of compulsory third party 
insurance, being ‘insurance against legal liability for negligence’, whilst operating upon, 
was irrelevant to creating, legal liability.100  Accordingly, and apparently consistent with 
the irrelevance view discussed previously, it did not (and should not) ‘provide a step in a 
process of reasoning’101 towards a revision of the standard of care owed by a learner 
driver to their instructor.  Rather: 
  
If the existence of a scheme of compulsory third party insurance is a reason for 
giving an affirmative answer, and not merely a basis for an inclination to be 
pleased with such an answer, then there must be a principled explanation for 
that.102  
 
Therefore, instead of influencing the content of the substantive law, or “the answer” to a 
particular question arising for decision,103 Gleeson CJ limited insurance’s relevance to 
merely forming part of the social background within which the law was made, 
acknowledging that: 
 
Without doubt, insurance is a major factor in the practical operation of the law of 
negligence as it applies to motor vehicle accidents ... It may be fair to say that, 
without the availability of reasonably affordable insurance, the application of the 
principles of the common law of negligence to the risks involved in driving a 
motor vehicle would mean that few people would drive ... Momentary inattention 
can be a cause of harm for which few motorists could afford to pay.104   
 
This view was expressed previously in Tame v New South Wales where his Honour 
stated that: ‘In the case of physical injury to person or property ... or resulting from 
commonplace activities such as driving a motor vehicle, the requirements as to legal 
responsibility are well settled, often against a background of insurance practice’.105 
 
In advocating the absence of a causal link between the actual presence or availability of 
insurance and ‘the reach and shape of tort liability’,106 Stapleton also accepts that: 
 
it is not inconsistent with the traditional view of the irrelevance of insurance to 
liability, to acknowledge the clear relevance of insurance to the operation of tort 
law in daily life.  Judges who adopt the traditional view are quite aware that the 
pattern of insurance has a dominant effect on who sues and who is sued, as well 
as on the dynamics of the settlement process ... at a very general level it is quite 
likely that courts have been influenced by the growing incidence and social 
approval of the collectivisation of like risks by private insurance ... But more 
                                            
100 Imbree, above n 8, at [14].   
101 Ibid at [23]. 
102 Ibid (emphasis added). 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid at [22].  See also[23]. 
105 (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 at [15]. 
106 Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 820.  See also 826-8, 830, 833, 843; Stapleton, ‘Private 
Law and Institutional Competition’, above n 10, at 531; Lewis, above n 1, at 97-8, 101-2.  Cf  Morgan, above n 28, 
at 384-5, 392. 
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specific claims linking the expansion and shape of tort liability with the availability 
of liability insurance must be handled with great caution.107 
 
Therefore, whilst insurance undoubtedly influences ‘the institutional context within which 
tort law is practised’,108 and its practical operation (in terms of who is sued, what claims 
are brought, how they are paid, and how they are defended), similarly to Gleeson CJ, 
Stapleton argues that insurance should not provide “the reason” for a decision regarding 
the development of legal rules or tortious standards of care.  Rather, judges should 
consider insurance solely as a “make-weight” factor, or as part of the social background, 
that justifies, or supports, a decision made on more legitimate grounds.109 
 
Limiting, in this way, the significance of insurance to providing ‘an inclination to be 
pleased’ with a legal decision or rule of law110 echoes Seale v Perry.  There McGarvie J 
recognised that, in contrast to deciding that a tortious duty of care exists, when 
considering ‘whether it is fair, practical and sensible that one party in a particular 
category of relationships should be liable for his carelessness to the other, an inquiry 
whether one or other or both are likely to be covered by insurance, is an inquiry for quite 
a different purpose’.111  In Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui,112 whilst contemplating 
a private surveyor’s duty to the subsequent purchaser of a dwelling, Smith J likewise 
confined insurance’s utility to shaping the landscape within which legal decision making, 
or policy formation, occurred, stating: 
 
I do not, however, accept, as argued for the appellants, that the Tribunal 
reasoned that merely because a private building surveyor had to be insured he or 
she might owe a duty of care to the building owner.  The Tribunal was making the 
point that the requirement of insurance was an important part of a 
comprehensive statutory scheme designed to ensure that all building 
practitioners responsible for defective work could be held accountable.113 
 
The existence of compulsory insurance was also recognised as a relevant ‘contextual 
consideration’ by Kirby J in Imbree.114  However, as discussed, his Honour went further 
to conclude that it influenced ‘the answer to questions such as the existence of a 
propounded duty of care; its ambit and definition’.115 
 
 
  
                                            
107 Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 825-6.  
108 Lewis, above n 1, at 85.  For example, according to Lewis ‘[i]nsurers are the paymasters of the tort system’ (at 
87) and dictate what principles of law are appealed and ‘when, and for how much, claims are settled’ (at 86).  
Accordingly, he claims that ‘[i]nsurers’ control over the litigation process has not been emphasised sufficiently 
when the effect of insurance upon individual cases and on tort rules has been considered’ (at 87).  See also 88-93; 
Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 824-5.  
109 Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 827, 833. 
110 Imbree, above n 8, at [23] (Gleeson CJ).   
111 Seale, above n 22, at 237.  See also 238 (in the context of whether the solicitor of a negligently witnessed will 
owed a duty of care to the intended beneficiaries). 
112 [2004] VSC 239.  Cf Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui (2006) 14 VR 55; [2006] VSCA 30, above n 28. 
113 [2004] VSC 239 at [81] (emphasis added).  See also Kars, above n 52, at 378-9, 381-2 (Toohey, McHugh, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ) discussed at above n 52-55 and accompanying text: ‘insurance, including compulsory 
statutory insurance, is an extremely important feature of the social environment in which tort litigation occurs’ (at 
378). 
114 Imbree, above n 8, at [169]. 
115 Ibid (emphasis added).  See also Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie, above n 23 and accompanying text. 
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V IMPLICATIONS 
 
Whilst the High Court’s decision in Imbree is therefore not definitive as to the future 
relevance of insurance to tortious liability, its implications for the pertinence of insurance 
in the development of negligence law are arguably threefold: 
 
1. Whilst its relevance to the formation of negligence principle ‘has long been, a 
controversial question in our law’,116 there are signs in Imbree that attitudes 
towards insurance might be ‘changing from a total denial of relevance to a more 
nuanced principle’117 of some degree of materiality, at least, according to Kirby J, 
where insurance is compulsory, and potentially where it becomes commonplace. 
2. Whichever view one adopts, it will be influenced by jurisprudential argument 
concerning the nature and function of the law of negligence as a vehicle for 
corrective or distributive justice. 
3. Whilst confined to a consideration of insurance’s relevance to standard of care in 
Imbree, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J’s conclusions in this regard impact upon all 
principles of negligence liability, including the emerging notion of claimant 
vulnerability.   
 
These will be discussed in turn. 
    
A A More Nuanced Principle 
Gleeson CJ’s acceptance, in Imbree, that whilst insurance ought not provide a reason 
for a legal decision it might still provide an inclination for being pleased with such a 
decision, is troublesome.  Surely if something provides a reason for being pleased with 
an outcome, it also provides justification for it?  If not, might not one question the point 
of considering it at all?118  Additionally, to assert that at its highest level of relevance 
insurance is a make-weight factor of no independent force, which merely supports a 
decision made on other grounds, seems tenuous.  Once acknowledged in this way in 
the judgement process, one would think it almost ‘impossible to blot out the effect of 
[this] known factor’ which would then ‘act as a stimulus to decision-making, whether or 
not the decision-maker [was] consciously aware of it’.119  Accordingly, Davies states that 
‘[t]he very act of denying the relevance of liability insurance to the issue of determination 
of liability is, in itself, an acknowledgement that insurance is an influential factor’.120   
 
Therefore, although purportedly adopting the irrelevance view in Imbree, it might be 
argued that Gleeson CJ was instead adopting a more middle, or opportunistic, view.  A 
view which, in contrast to Kirby J, whilst rejecting the relevance of insurance as a factor 
of direct input into the formation of negligence principle, still champions its selective use 
to retrospectively justify decisions made.   On the other hand, Kirby J’s conclusion, that 
insurance is a consideration influential to tortious liability, appears confined to systems 
of universal or compulsory insurance.121   
                                            
116 Imbree, above n 8, at [137] (Kirby J). 
117 Ibid at [175].  See also Jones, above n 14, p 8. 
118 A similar criticism might also be made of McGarvie J’s approach in Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193 discussed at 
above n 111 and accompanying text. 
119 Davies, above n 24, at 82. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See, eg, Imbree, above n 8, at [171]: ‘The availability and existence of voluntary liability insurance is one thing.  
The compulsory provisions for universal statutory third-party insurance of all motor vehicles registered for use on 
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When compared to situations of non-compulsory insurance, Kirby J’s limitation in 
Imbree might be defended, firstly, on the basis that it is not subject to criticism for 
invoking complex evidentiary issues concerning the existence of insurance.  Individual 
policies are generally not discoverable.122  Nevertheless, courts should be wary of 
forming ‘conclusions on the availability of insurance, or the impact of imposing fresh 
liability on the insurance market generally, without proper material’.123  That insurance is 
not always available and/or affordable was illustrated in connection with the recent Civil 
Liability Act reforms.124  However, such evidence is unnecessary when insurance is 
compulsory.   
 
Limiting the relevance of insurance, in the formulation of negligence principle, to the 
special context of compulsory insurance, also alleviates accusations of arbitrary judicial 
decision-making according to whether insurance is or is not held.125  Indeed, it is due to 
such allegations, as well as a normal lack of discoverability, that, subject perhaps to the 
exception outlined below,126 a party’s particular insurance cover should always be 
irrelevant to a finding of liability.127   For example in Imbree, the consideration of 
insurance arose solely in the context of addressing the standard of care owed by all 
learner drivers of motor vehicles.  Here, insurance being compulsory, personal injury 
claims against an uninsured defendant would be exceptional and when occurring the 
claimant might sue the nominal defendant.128  Therefore, a general consideration of 
insurance in decision-making in Imbree would not lead to the development of a 
‘distorting principle’ the application of which might result in a different, or unfair, answer 
being given in a personal injuries case where there was no compulsory insurance.129  
By comparison, consideration of insurance’s existence in forming the principle 
                                                                                                                                             
Australian roads is quite another’.  See also [14] (Gleeson CJ), [108], [112], [130], [143], [169]-[170], [178]-[179], 
[181] (Kirby J); Caltex, above n 22, at 581 (Stephen J). 
122 Unless, a party is referred to in the insurance contract, an insurer is joined in proceedings, the insurance is 
relevant to a fact or matter in issue, or disclosure is allowed pursuant to some specific statutory right (for example, 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 596A, 596B).  See generally, Duffy, above n 17.  Additionally, disclosure cannot be 
compelled in aid of mediation: Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd [2009] FCA 695.  However, whilst evidence of 
insurance is generally inadmissible in jury trials, this has not been the case in relation to compulsory insurance: 
Davies, above n 24, at 81. 
123 Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] 1 AC 211 at 228-9 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick).  See also 
State of New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; [2003] HCA 4 at [36] (Gleeson CJ); Cattanach v Melchior 
(2003) 215 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 38 at [177] (Kirby J); Esanda, above n 28, at 282-3 (McHugh J), 302-3 (Gummow 
J); Caltex, above n 22, at 581 (Stephen J); Wills, above n 10, at 353 (Mason P).  Cf Evans, above n 28, at [12] 
where, in the absence of contrary evidence, the availability to the defendants of non-compulsory third party liability 
insurance was considered, by the English Court of Appeal, ‘a reasonable assumption to make’.  
124 See above n 3 and accompanying text. 
125 See, eg, Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 825-6.  
126 See below n 193 and accompanying text. 
127 See, eg, Mills, above n 6, at 35; Cane, above n 28, p 202-3; Johnson, above n 29, at 7 (Kirby P). 
128 See, eg, Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) ss 31, 33. 
129 Kars, above n 52, at 379 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).  Cf Imbree, above n 8, at [21] where 
Gleeson CJ argued that ‘[i]f the answer to the problem in the present case depends upon the existence of compulsory 
insurance, then presumably a different answer would, or at least may, be given in a case where there is no 
compulsory insurance’.  Whilst this argument might apply to property damage claims arising from the use of a 
motor vehicle, which are not covered by compulsory third party insurance, it is likely that the objective standard of 
the hypothetical reasonable driver would also be owed in relation to damage caused by a learner to objects on or 
near a roadway, primarily on grounds of coherency (Nettleship, above n 79, at 699, 702; Imbree, above n 8, at [15]-
[17], [20], [49].  See also above n 78 and accompanying text).  In such cases it might also be argued that differential 
decision-making would not occur, as unless the defendant is covered by voluntary insurance for property damage, or 
other means of payment, ‘it is much less likely, as a matter of practical reality, that litigation will ensue’ (Kars, 
above n 52, at 382). 
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espoused in Lynch130 (that a claimant injured though negligence is entitled to damages 
for any resulting gratuitous care required, including care provided by the defendant), 
has been criticised.   Lynch arose in circumstances involving a motor vehicle accident 
and a resultant policy of benefiting accident victims via compulsory third party 
insurance, which in that case ‘weighed in favour of allowing [the claimant] to recover the 
value of gratuitous services’ no matter who provided them.131 However, Fleming 
questioned ‘the suggestion that the ruling would or might be confined’ to motor vehicle 
accidents, or situations of compulsory insurance,132 and the principle was subsequently 
justified on other grounds.133  Accordingly, if arbitrary decision-making is to be avoided, 
a principle truly dependant in its operation upon a practice of compulsory insurance 
should be limited to that area.  
 
Nevertheless, whilst confined to compulsory insurance in Imbree, Kirby J134 and 
others135 ‘have referred to the availability, cost and likelihood of insurance as relevant 
considerations in defining the existence, and ambit’,136 of tortious principle where, 
although not strictly compulsory, insurance is ‘available and commonly procured’.137   
For example, in Johnson his Honour stated that ‘[a]lthough it is not a field of compulsory 
insurance, there seems little doubt that the widespread and prudent acquisition of 
insurance against occupier’s liability has also affected the development of the common 
law in that context’.138  Kirby J has also recognised that when not routinely procured 
‘[t]he danger of unexpectedly burdening uninsured occupiers may sometimes, 
subconsciously, influence judicial expositions of the standard of care which occupiers 
                                            
130 Discussed at above n 59-63 and accompanying text. 
131 JG Fleming, ‘Damages Against the Helpful Tortfeasor’ (1992) 66 Australian Journal 388 at 389. 
132 Ibid.  A ‘motor vehicle exception’ or ‘insurance-dependent rule of tort liability’ should not be created by the 
courts: Dobson, above n 16, at 755, 784 (Lamer CJ, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Binnie JJ).   
133 Namely, that damages for gratuitous care are awarded on the basis of the plaintiff’s need for care due to the 
defendant’s negligence.  Accordingly, the care-giver’s identity is irrelevant, both to that need and the claimant’s 
entitlement to compensation: Kars, above n 52, at 379-82 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).  See also 
above n 52-55 and accompanying text.  
134 See, eg, above n 93-96 and accompanying text; Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 at 518 
(Kirby P), at above n 23 and accompanying text; Pyrenees, above n 38, at [253] (Kirby J) (‘[o]wners and occupiers 
of property commonly do, and should, protect themselves, including by fire insurance’) (emphasis added). 
135 See, eg, Robertson, above n 28, at 361 (King CJ) (‘[o]ne is, I suppose, permitted to know that the Public Risk 
policy commonly used by insurance companies excludes indemnity for legal liability to members of the insured’s 
family residing with’ them) (emphasis added); Smith v Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858 (Lord Griffiths), at above n 32 
and accompanying text.  Additionally, in imposing the duty to insure in Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospitals 
NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 at [39] (see above n 34 and accompanying text), Waller LJ was ‘clearly 
influenced by the fact that the evidence was, overwhelmingly, that public liability insurance should be in place for 
the activities in question’: Naylor (t/a Mainstreet) v Payling [2004] EWCA Civ 560 at [19] (Latham LJ).  See also 
[40]-[43] (Neuberger LJ), [59] (Waller LJ).  
136 Imbree, above n 8, at [166] (Kirby J). 
137 Ibid at [157]. A consideration of insurance at this level (where it is available and commonly procured), rather 
than in relation to the “insurability of a particular individual,” also counters the argument that ‘because most risks 
are insurable, at least at some price, the criterion would nearly always support liability’: Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance 
and Ideology’, above n 1, at 828. 
138 Johnson, above n 29, at 6 (Kirby P) (emphasis added).  See also Neindorf, above n 37, at [76] (Kirby J): ‘It is 
against risks of the kind that materialised that people such as the appellant can be expected to take precautions (and 
against the chance that they may fail, they can be expected normally to secure householders’ insurance as thousands 
do)’.  Cf Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 at 245 (Kirby P): A judge may not take ‘into account 
the common experience that bodies such as the respondent invariably take the precaution of securing insurance 
cover to provide indemnity in respect of a claim such as that of the appellant’.  See also above n 97 and 
accompanying text. 
18 
 
are required to achieve’.139  Conversely, when ‘fortuitous’, insurance has been deemed 
irrelevant.140   
 
The consideration of a widespread or common practice of insuring (or not) in relation to 
a class of persons, or field of activity, by its nature eschews many of the evidentiary 
issues concerning the general existence, availability and affordability of insurance 
discussed above.  Subject of course to the extent of any common practice, it also 
addresses, at least partially,141 arbitrary decision-making concerns.  Indeed, the need 
for insurance in relation to a particular activity may become so generally accepted, 
expected, or commonplace that it is akin to compulsory.142  Furthermore, in cases where 
voluntary (or even compulsory)143 insurance is not held, it might also be argued that 
differential decision-making would not occur.  This is because where insurance is 
commonplace in relation to a class of persons or field of liability, the cases, in which the 
principles of tortious liability applying to such areas are defined, will typically involve 
insurance.  Furthermore, in relation to liability insurance, unless the defendant is 
covered by other means of payment, it is unlikely, in reality, that litigation in that area will 
ensue.  However, if it does and commonly held insurance is not held, judges, and the 
community generally, may be more prepared to accept that anomaly and any perceived 
unfairness occurring due to the application of an insurance influenced principle to a non-
insured party.144   
 
Consequently, there are signs in Imbree that attitudes towards the utility of insurance in 
the formation of negligence law might be ‘changing from a total denial of relevance to a 
more nuanced principle’145 of some degree of materiality.  Whilst this is most obvious in 
Kirby J’s judgement, it is arguably also apparent to some extent in that of Gleeson CJ.  
Furthermore, whilst the relevance of insurance to negligence liability, at least according 
to Kirby J, may be more likely to be considered when its presence is universal or 
compulsory,146 there is potential for this argument to expand to where insurance 
becomes commonplace.                                                                      
      
                                            
139 Neindorf, above n 37, at [65]. 
140 See, eg, Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1959] AC 604 at 627 (Viscount Simonds), at above n 12 and 
accompanying text. 
141 Again, arbitrary decision-making may still occur if, similarly to Lynch, a principle dependent in its operation 
upon a common practice of insurance in one area (in relation to a class of persons or field of activity) is not confined 
to that area but is instead of general application.  See discussion at above n 130 and accompanying text. 
142 For example, in Naylor, Latham CJ refers to overwhelming evidence that public liability insurance should be in 
place for activities at public events: above n 35, at [19].  See also Gwilliam, above n 34, at [39] (Waller LJ).    
Therefore, whilst arguably common in the area of occupiers’ or householders’ public liability (What is Public 
Liability (2008) Rural & General Insurance Broking Pty Ltd <http://www.ruralandgeneral.com.au/insurance-
consumer-what-is-public-liability-insurance.php#voluntary>; Luntz et al, above n 1, p 15; Robertson, above n 28, at 
361), in some occupations (for example, the technology industry), although similarly non-compulsory, liability 
insurance is almost universally held.    
143 This argument (discussed further at below n 188) might also be used in relation to cases which, unlike Imbree, 
are not covered by a nominal defendant type scheme and where insurance, whilst compulsory, is not held. 
144 See, eg, Lynch, above n 59, at 420 (Gleeson CJ, Clarke JA and Hope AJA); Kars, above n 52, at 382 (Toohey, 
McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).   
145 Imbree, above n 8, at [175].   
146 In addition to motor vehicle accidents (see, eg, Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 20), insurance may be 
compulsory in relation to: health or medical practitioners (see, eg, Health Care Liability Act 2001 (NSW) s 19; 
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Queensland) s 129); financial services licensees (see, eg, 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 912B); and employer’s liability (see, eg, Workers’ Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 
155. Where an employer is uninsured, claims may be made against the nominal insurer: s 140).  
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B Corrective or Distributive Justice?147 
 
Lord Steyn once said that ‘[i]t is important to be clear about the general aim of the law of 
tort because it will influence our thinking about concrete problems’.148 Accordingly, no 
matter which view is adopted regarding the role of insurance in negligence liability, it will 
be influenced by one’s own political and moral values149 concerning torts’ function as a 
vehicle of corrective or distributive justice.150  
 
In this light, those adopting the irrelevance view arguably favour the corrective justice 
approach with which tort law has traditionally been concerned.151  Corrective justice 
champions the two-dimensional shifting, or fixing, of loss between parties to a dispute 
according to relative fault152 (which in negligence liability is found in a lack of reasonable 
care, or breach of duty).  It focuses solely upon interpersonal responsibility and the fact 
that actions are restorative as between the claimant and the defendant.153  
Consequently, to a defender of corrective justice, insurance is irrelevant to tort because 
it is external to the claimant-defendant relationship154 and requires a consideration, in 
imposing liability, of the fairness of shifting a loss, not just between the parties, but 
throughout the whole community of premium payers.  This has been acknowledged by 
Stapleton, who in advocating the irrelevance of insurance to tortious liability has stated 
that 
 
so long as tort (and indeed civil liability in general) is viewed and structured as a 
system of individual responsibility, we cannot convincingly draw a moral 
distinction between defendants merely on the basis of their capacity to share or 
offload that responsibility onto others in an insurance pool.155 
 
Stephen J also rejected the significance of first party insurance to the determination of a 
duty for pure economic loss in Caltex on the basis that the court’s task was one ‘of loss 
fixing rather than loss spreading’.156 
 
                                            
147 This distinction was originally made in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.   
148 Lord Steyn, ‘Perspectives of Corrective and Distributive Justice in Tort Law’ (2002) 37 The Irish Jurist 1 at 4. 
149 Lewis, above n 1, at 99; Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 820, 837; Morgan, above n 28, at 
397. 
150 A consideration of the relevance of insurance to negligence liability might also depend upon one’s view as to the 
other functions of tort law, for example, as a system of deterrence.  If individual insurance premiums are not 
adjusted with reference to a defendant’s claim record, insurance may be viewed as inconsistent with the notion that 
tort is a mechanism through which defendants are “punished” for wrongdoing (see, eg, JG Fleming, ‘Is There a 
Future for Tort?’ (1984) 58 Australian Law Journal 131 at 133-5).  However, it is not possible in this article to 
consider all the social functions performed by the law of torts in detail. 
151 See, eg, Lord Steyn, above n 148, at 4-5. 
152 Jones, above n 14, pp 8, 13. 
153 A Beever, ‘Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law’ (2008) 28(3) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 475 at 476-8; Morgan, above n 28, at 392. 
154 Beever, above n 153, at 498.  See also 494. 
155 Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 825.  See also 832, 843. 
156 Caltex, above n 22, at 580.  See also Perre, above n 10, at 230 (McHugh J); Lord Diplock, above n 10, at 499 
(‘spreading the risk is not a function to be undertaken by judges under the guise of defining a duty of care owed by 
one citizen to another’).  Cf Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 at 176 where, as an argument supporting 
the recovery of damages for gratuitous services, Stephen J stated: ‘a result which allows the injured person to 
recover damages in respect of the provider’s services, so that he may be in a position to reimburse the provider, is a 
desirable policy goal; the wrongdoer, likely to carry liability insurance, will prove a much better loss distributor’. 
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Recognition of insurance’s influence in legal decision-making therefore invokes notions 
of distributive justice,157 or the wider distribution of burdens amongst society158 or, in the 
case of compulsory motor vehicle insurance, all those benefiting from an activity.  As 
such, it requires a consideration of ‘the effects of a decision beyond the immediate 
parties to the dispute’.159  For example, in grounding a learner driver’s standard of care 
upon the availability of compulsory motor vehicle insurance in Nettleship, Lord Denning 
MR stated: ‘we are, in this branch of the law, moving away from the concept: “No liability 
without fault.”  We are beginning to apply the test: “On whom should the risk fall?”’160  
Indeed, the relevance of insurance is often justified with reference to the erosion of 
negligence law’s corrective justice function through the dilution of fault based on the 
parties’ interpersonal responsibility.161  Such erosion may be seen in the area of 
vicarious liability,162 which imposes judgement upon an innocent defendant (generally 
an employer), for the wrongful acts of another, upon the basis that, when compared to 
the victim or actual wrongdoer (who may lack the means to pay), the employer is a 
better loss distributor – having the ability to pass on the cost via increased prices for 
goods or services, or the payment of lower salaries or dividends.163  Stapleton also 
recognises that where tortious loss shifting ceases to be determined by fault, insurance 
may have a greater role to play.  She argues that as ‘an individual’s chance of being 
injured by ... “carelessness” in a road accident is not all that much different from their 
chance of inadvertently causing such injuries to others’, the ‘“fault” notion can look 
particularly artificial’.164  Consequentially, she infers that, whilst generally irrelevant, in 
the special context of compulsory third party motor vehicle cover, insurance may be 
influential ‘in the exposition of substantive tort’ doctrine.165   Also contra to insurance’s 
non-recognition is the fact that, insurance aside, negligence law is already 
redistributional.  This is because, like those vicariously liable, it is similarly rare for the 
person actually at fault to be the one who ultimately pays any compensation 
awarded.166    
                                            
157 See, eg, Robertson, above n 28, at 361 where, in referring to the public risk policy commonly used by insurance 
companies, King CJ stated: ‘In considering whether it is justified in erecting a duty of care arising out of a particular 
relationship, a court cannot ignore the considerations of loss distribution in the community which lies at the heart of 
the law of torts’.   
158 Beever, above n 153, at 486; Lamb, above n 39, at 637; Smith, above n 32, at 859; Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd 
[1973] 1 QB 792 at 798 (Lord Denning MR) (courts ‘would not find negligence so readily – or award sums of such 
increasing magnitude – except on the footing that the damages are to be borne, not by the man himself, but by an 
insurance company’). 
159 Lewis, above n 1, at 95. 
160 Nettleship, above n 79, at 700.  See also above n 85 and accompanying text; White v White [1950] P 39 at 59. 
161 See, eg, Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis, above n 28, pp 56-7, 226; Fleming, ‘Is There a Future for Tort?’, 
above n 150, at 140-1; Wills, above n 10, at 352. 
162 Luntz et al, above n 1, p 27-8; Morgan, above n 28, at 393-4. 
163 Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; [2000] HCA 52 at [253].  ‘In this way the innocent victim is not left to bear 
the whole loss himself.  It is distributed amongst the community in a way that is fair to all’: Launchbury, above n 53, 
at 253-4 (Lord Denning MR). 
164 Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 842.  However, problematically, the ‘atypical mutuality 
of risk’ upon which this argument is based is not present in reality.  See, eg, A Drummond, An Overview of Novice 
Driver Performance Issues: A Literature Review (October 1989) Monash University Accident Research Centre, iii, 
4-5 <http://www.monash.edu.au/muarc/reports/muarc009.pdf> which confirms that the over-involvement of 
inexperienced drivers in road accidents is well established, with the risk of accident decreasing with experience.  See 
also Luntz et al, above n 1, p 17. 
165 Imbree, above n 8, at [177] (Kirby J).  See also [178]; Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 
841-3.   
166 Dimond v Lovell [2000] 2 All ER 897 at 907-8; P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2002, pp 242-5; Fleming, ‘Is There a Future for Tort?’, above n 150, at 140-1.  However a corrective justice 
theorist might argue that as long as fairness, or fault, between claimant and defendant requires a loss to be borne by 
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Accordingly, whilst it might be argued that Gleeson CJ’s rejection of the utility of 
insurance in Imbree was due to a strict justification of tort as a system of corrective 
justice, Kirby J acknowledged ‘the fiction of individual personal liability’,167 and the 
influence of insurance’s distributive consequences, by stating: 
 
If such compulsory insurance were not part of the legal background to the 
expression of the applicable common law, and, if it were the case, or even 
possible, that someone in the position of the driver (or owner) of the vehicle 
would, or might, be personally liable for the consequences of that person’s 
driving ... it is extremely unlikely, in my view, that the courts would impose on 
them liability.168 
 
However, because the stance adopted on insurance will depend upon a balancing of 
these justifications and one’s own opinion as to which is appropriate, any general 
agreement about the role that insurance ought to play169 in the formation of negligence 
principle may, in fact, be impossible.   
 
C Vulnerability 
 
Defined as a claimant’s ‘inability to protect itself from the consequences of a 
defendant’s want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would 
cast the consequences of loss on the defendant’,170 in recent years claimant 
vulnerability has emerged as an important influence,171 in many cases, upon the scope 
and content of negligence liability.172  Traditionally considered when determining the 
circumstances in which a duty of care will be owed,173 an inability to protect oneself will, 
therefore, be a factor adding to vulnerability, whilst an ability to do so may result in a 
duty being denied.  Accordingly, whilst confined to the principle of standard of care in 
Imbree, as the implications of that case apply to all principles of negligence liability, they 
will also influence whether a claimant’s ability to protect themself through the 
procurement of first party insurance will be seen as a likely indicator of their lack of 
                                                                                                                                             
a defendant, how the defendant subsequently spreads this loss to others is irrelevant:  Beever, above n 153, at 494-5; 
Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 843.  Consequently, they might further argue that the fact 
that a defendant does not generally bear the loss themself lends no support to the argument that insurance ought to 
be relevant to the formulation of negligence liability. 
167 Imbree, above n 8, at [112].   
168 Ibid at [111] (emphasis in original). 
169 Lewis, above n 1, at 99. 
170 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 515; [2004] HCA 16 at [23] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) (‘Woolcock’).  See also [80] (McHugh J), [168]-[169] (Kirby J); Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 59 at [93], [100] (McHugh J) 
(‘Crimmins’). 
171 Woolcock, above n 170, at [80]; Crimmins, above n 170, at [100].  However vulnerability, like insurance (see 
above n 46 and accompanying text), is insufficient alone to ground liability: Woolcock, above n 170, at [224]; Perre, 
above n 10, at 227-8, 285; Crimmins, above n 170, at [222]; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 
CLR 540; [2002] HCA 54 at 597-8, 664.  Therefore, if first party insurance is relevant to vulnerability, because 
claimant vulnerability is merely one of the factors balanced by the court when determining whether a duty of care is 
owed, it cannot be argued that there is automatically no place for liability in all cases where insurance is readily 
available.   
172 See, eg, J Stapleton, ‘The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable’ (2003) 24 
Australian Bar Review 1 at 7-8. 
173 See, eg, Woolcock, above n 170, at [23]-[24]; Crimmins, above n 170, at [93], [100].  However, as the elements 
of the negligence action are interrelated, notions of vulnerability pervade the action: Koehler v Cerebos (Aust) Ltd 
(2005) 222 CLR 44; [2005] HCA 15 at [25], [36], [41]-[42] (considered in breach); Harvey v PD (2004) 59 NSWLR 
639; [2004] NSWCA 97 at [88], [106] (considered in causation). 
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vulnerability.  In this area also, one’s stance as to the relevance of insurance has been 
influenced by notions of corrective vis-à-vis distributive justice and, to a lesser extent, 
whether the existence of insurance is universal or commonplace. 
 
Many judges have propounded that ‘whether the plaintiff has purchased, or is able to 
purchase, insurance’ is ‘generally not relevant to the issue of vulnerability’.174 And again 
the tendency has been to ground this view in the belief that, as first party insurance 
does not ‘internalise the loss to the careless party’,175 its recognition as an appropriate 
form of self-protection impedes ‘the goals of negligence law, as an instrument of 
corrective justice’.176  However in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd,177 
when considering whether a group of commercial gas customers were vulnerable to the 
risk caused by a negligent stoppage of gas supply, Gillard J acknowledged that: 
 
In this day and age, whilst corrective justice and deterrence are important aims of 
tort law, distributive justice has its part to play ... The concept of distributive 
justice is not new.  It “requires a focus on the just distribution of burdens and 
losses among members of the society”.178 
 
Consequently his Honour held that: 
 
Insurance is relevant to the issue of vulnerability.  Business interruption 
insurance is commonplace, is an option open to any business to protect its 
interests against business interruption and in my view, is relevant to the issue of 
whether there was a duty of care in the present proceeding.179  
 
Nevertheless, Gillard J also recognised that ‘whether or not insurance is relevant to an 
issue in the present case depends upon the particular circumstances’.180  Therefore, 
although a lack of vulnerability also told against a duty of care in relation to domestic 
gas customers, as first party insurance against such risk was presumably not 
commonplace in this context, their vulnerability was instead negated by their ability to 
purchase items to meet such interruption or change their living habits.181 
 
                                            
174 Perre, above n 10, at 230 (McHugh J) (emphasis added).  See also 204; Vairy, above n 13, at [53] (Gummow J) 
(see above n 13 and accompanying text); Fortuna Seafoods Pty Ltd v The Ship ‘Eternal Wind’ [2005] QSC 4 at [28] 
(Douglas J) (‘Fortuna’); (2008) 1 Qd R 429; [2005] QCA 405 at [23] (McMurdo P). 
175 J Stapleton, ‘Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory”’ (2002) 50 UCLA 
Law Review 531 at 553.  See also 558. 
176 Perre, above n 10, at 220 (McHugh J).  See also 230, 236; J Stapleton, ‘Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and 
Alternative Opportunities for Deterrence’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 301 at 301, 333; Stapleton, ‘Tort, 
Insurance and Ideology’, above n 1, at 833.  Cf Esanda, above n 28, at 284-6, 289 where McHugh J referred to the 
‘demands of corrective justice’ in refusing to impose upon auditors a duty of care to third party financiers acting in 
reliance upon audited accounts and reports, in part, due to their ability to protect themselves by insuring their debts 
and distributing their losses. 
177 (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27 (‘Johnson Tiles’).  
178 Ibid at [1105]-[1106], referring to McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 at 82 (Lord Steyn). 
179 Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1103].  See generally [1071]-[1112].  The ability of a claimant to secure 
protection against the consequences of another’s negligence, via insurance, has also been considered specifically, in 
relation to vulnerability, in Re Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq); Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd v 
McGrath (2006) 237 ALR 389; [2006] FCA 1403 at [81]; and Chandra v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2007) 13 
BPR 24,675; [2007] NSWSC 694 at [126]-[129] (‘Chandra’), and more generally in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v 
Martin & Co [1973] 1 QB 27 at 38-9; Pyrenees, above n 38; Lamb, above n 39; and Esanda, above n 28, at 284-6.  
180 Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1094]. 
181 Ibid at [1112]. 
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The recognition of insurance as a factor relevant to the establishment of claimant 
vulnerability might be justified on the basis that, whilst corrective justice focuses upon 
the fairness of loss shifting between the parties to a dispute according to their relative 
demerits,182 ‘the self-concept of vulnerability’183 instead requires a greater consideration 
of the claimant’s individual merits when determining the existence of a duty.  
Accordingly, it is maintainable, in regards to the principle of vulnerability, that as tort law 
again moves away from strict notions of interpersonal fault184 towards an approach 
focusing more upon a plaintiff’s own personal protection or responsibility, the individual 
coverage provided by first party insurance, although still arguably distributive, becomes 
more apposite and congruent with torts’ aims.  However, where this position is adopted, 
it is probable, as Johnson Tiles illustrates, that a consideration of first party insurance is 
again more likely where universal,185 or at least commonplace, and consequently where 
there is evidence that it is ‘readily obtainable’.186  For example, in assessing claimant 
vulnerability in Re Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq); Australian Naturalcare Products Pty 
Ltd v McGrath, Gyles J commented that:  
 
The risk of a supplier of goods not being able to maintain supply is an every day 
[sic] incident of commercial life ... Various strategies to minimise risks of that kind 
and their impact are available to the intending purchaser.  Particular contractual 
provisions can be framed, insurance can be sought.187 
 
The consideration of a widespread practice of insurance is supported by the reasons 
discussed above.188  It is also consistent with the fact that the obligation imposed by 
vulnerability requires only “reasonable” steps of self-protection.189  In assessing 
insurance’s relevance to vulnerability it is, therefore, appropriate that a court’s 
                                            
182 See, eg, Fleming, ‘Is There a Future for Tort?’, above n 150, at 140. 
183 As described in Chandra, above n 179, at [126] (Bryson AJ). 
184 See, eg, above n 161 and accompanying text. 
185 Whilst denying the relevance of first party insurance to negligence liability generally in Caltex (see above n 22 
and accompanying text), Stephen J acknowledged: ‘[T]hat loss should, in the case of involuntary torts, lie where it 
falls, there to be spread by recourse to the relatively efficient device of loss insurance (more efficient, for various 
reasons, than liability insurance) may have much to be said for it.  Particularly this is so in areas in which insurance 
of one sort or another in fact becomes universal, whether or not as a result of governmental intervention’: above n 
22, at 581.  Aff’d Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1086].   
186 Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1099].  See also [1093], [1105]; Fortuna, above n 174, at [28]. Indeed in 
Woolcock, Kirby J considered that, in the absence of evidence, courts should be reluctant to assume that a claimant 
lacks vulnerability: above n 170, at [178].  However, in Johnson Tiles, insurance policies were admitted into 
evidence: above n 177, at [1078]-[1079], [1099], [1104]. 
187 Above n 179, at [81] (in the context of whether Naturalcare were owed a duty of care in connection with the non-
supply of therapeutic goods).   
188 See above n 141-144 and accompanying text.  Arbitrary decision-making does not occur if a universal or 
common practice of insurance, amongst the class of persons to whom a claimant belongs, is considered when 
determining vulnerability.  This is evidenced in Johnson Tiles, above n 177.  There, although one of the five 
claimants was uninsured (at [1073]), the court’s finding (that commercial customers, due to the prevalence of 
business interruption insurance, are not vulnerable to economic loss arising from utility failure), tending against the 
imposition of a duty of care in their favour, was applied equally to all claimants (at [1110]).  However, since 
vulnerability involves a consideration of the inability of claimants to take reasonable steps of self-protection and 
common practice, or what similar claimants “ordinarily” do, is arguably the gauge by which this is measured (see 
below n 189-192 and accompanying text), it is perhaps unsurprising that when applying this principle no unfairness 
was perceived to result according to whether the particular claimant was, or was not, insured in fact. 
189 See, eg, Woolcock, above n 170, at [114], [168], [173]; Crimmins, above n 170, at [93]; Perre, above n 10, at 
225; Western Districts Developments Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (2009) 75 NSWLR 706; [2009] 
NSWCA 283 at [86]-[87]; Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1073].   
24 
 
consideration of reasonableness be guided by prevailing community standards190 as 
evidenced by common practice.  Accordingly, if market conditions191 or social 
expectations,192 customarily deny appropriate insurance protection, in the absence of 
other protection mechanisms, this factor should reinforce claimant vulnerability.   
 
Nevertheless, in determining vulnerability the courts have not always proceeded in 
terms of common practice amongst the class of persons to whom the claimant belongs.  
Rather, some cases have focused more upon the vulnerability of the specific 
individual.193  This is evidenced by Chandra v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd, where the 
claimant’s insistence on credit insurance was taken to exemplify ‘how it used and could 
use contractual arrangements to protect itself from loss’.194  Therefore, an emphasis 
upon the vulnerability principle’s self-protective nature may mean that, irrespective of 
allegations of arbitrary decision-making,195 future courts may feel more justified in also 
considering a claimant’s particular insurance cover in this area.  Indeed, addressing 
evidentiary concerns,196 the Western Australian Supreme Court has even ordered 
discovery of a claimant’s insurance on the basis that, being related to a matter in issue, 
‘the production of policies of insurance and their subsequent tendering at trial would be 
the best evidence of the availability of insurance and allow the fifth defendant to make 
good its plea on the vulnerability question’.197  
 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
Against a background of academic and judicial perspective, this article argues that the 
High Court’s decision in Imbree questions the conventional view that insurance is 
irrelevant to the formation of negligence principle.  It acknowledges that although tort 
law is inescapably affected by insurance practice, its relevance may not be confined to 
the social or institutional context within which legal decisions are made.  Rather, there 
are signs in Imbree of the adoption of a more nuanced principle which recognises 
insurance’s influence when justifying, either prospectively (Kirby J) or retrospectively 
(Gleeson CJ), the content of substantive law.  Furthermore, whilst judicial consideration 
of insurance is more likely when universal or compulsory, due to then alleviating 
criticism for invoking complex evidentiary issues or arbitrary decision-making, it is 
maintained that there is potential for this to expand to where insurance (whether first or 
                                            
190 See, eg, Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431; [1998] HCA 5 at 
[158] (Hayne J) (‘Romeo’): ‘The reasonableness of measures of protection must be judged according to the 
prevailing standards of the day’. 
191 See, eg, Woolcock, above n 170, at [169] (Kirby J) (‘commercial pressures’), [95] (McHugh J) (‘whether the 
securing of an alternative remedy in contract was really open ... depends upon current market conditions’). 
192 ‘The instructor who is just a friend helping to teach [another to drive] never does insure himself.  He should, 
therefore, be allowed to sue’: Nettleship, above n 79, at 702 (Lord Denning MR). 
193 See, eg, Northern Sandblasting, above n 28, at 368-9 (McHugh J); Politarhis v Westpac Banking Corporation 
[2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-008; [2009] SASC 96 at [118], [130] (Doyle CJ, Sulan and Vanstone JJ).  Cf 
Woolcock, above n 170, at [84], [94]-[96], [110] (McHugh J), [206] (Callinan J) (vulnerability considered in the 
context of the claimant being a member of a class of subsequent owners of commercial premises “ordinarily” able to 
protect themselves); Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1072]-[1073], [1099], [1103]. 
194 Above n 179, at [127] (Bryson AJ) (emphasis added) (in the context of whether Perpetual Trustees Victoria were 
owed a duty of care by a debtor’s solicitor after loaning money secured upon a fraudulently obtained certificate of 
title). 
195 Discussed at above n 125 and accompanying text. 
196 Discussed at above n 122 and accompanying text. 
197 Barrick Gold of Australia Ltd v FL Smidth Inc (No 3) [2009] WASC 364 at [10] (Sanderson M).  See also [11]-
[16]. 
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third party) is voluntary but commonplace.  As such Imbree has implications for 
principles of negligence liability beyond standard of care. In terms of claimant 
vulnerability, an acceptance of the relevance of first party insurance to decision-making 
may therefore mean that, where available, a case may be made that vulnerability is 
lacking.   
 
However, it must be noted that Imbree is not decisive.  Indeed, this article merely aims 
to outline the implications of that decision and how they might be justified.  The future 
relevance of insurance to negligence liability remains controversial.  As shown, the 
different views on this normative question predominantly reflect different attitudes to 
loss distribution according to corrective vis-à-vis distributive justice.  Consequently, 
whilst ‘a review of the relevance of insurance to the development of common law liability 
in tort may indeed be timely’,198 it may be more appropriately achieved via 
parliamentary, rather than judicial, activity.  In fact, it may be time to recognise that 
negligence is truly a ‘hybrid form of liability’199 with both corrective and distributive 
functions.   
 
Since the law develops in line with community expectation, policy considerations 
external to the claimant-defendant relationship are often taken into account when 
formulating negligence principle.200 Accordingly, where insurance is universal or 
widespread amongst a class of persons, it might be argued that prevailing community 
standards similarly dictate its explicit consideration as one of the numerous salient 
features relevant to determining liability in that area. In this way, as long as the law of 
negligence does not become ‘result-oriented’201 and impose liability according to the 
presence or absence of insurance alone, the relevance of insurance might be 
acknowledged whilst a predominant fault basis is maintained. 
 
                                            
198 Kars, above n 52, at 381-2 (Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).   
199 Imbree, above n 8, at [172] (Kirby J).  See also Jones, above n 14, pp 8-9; Johnson Tiles, above n 177, at [1105]-
[1106], at above n 178 and accompanying text. 
200 See, eg, Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243 at 291 (Toohey J): ‘Smith v Jenkins [(1970) 119 CLR 397] turns on 
the unwillingness of courts to find such a duty in circumstances where, although there is a relationship between the 
parties which ordinarily would give rise to a duty of care, the injury to the plaintiff arises from a serious criminal act 
in which both plaintiff and defendant participated ... It gives effect to the view, seen as reflecting prevailing 
community standards, that a person who is injured while participating in conduct which has been identified by the 
criminal law as inimical to society should not be entitled to the compensation that the civil law ordinarily provides’.  
See also 262; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 546 (Mason CJ and Wilson J) (where, in dissent, their 
Honours refused to find that a solicitor owed a duty of care to the executor of a will, in part, due to the onerous 
obligations that would then be imposed upon every solicitor having custody of such documents); Romeo, above n 
190, at 480-1 (Kirby J) (given that public authorities must act in the interest of the community as a whole, in 
determining their negligence liability individual interests are often balanced against wider public interest, as 
‘[d]emanding the expenditure of resources in one area ... necessarily diverts resources from other areas of equal or 
possibly greater priority’).    
201 Dobson, above n 16, at 795 (Lamer CJ, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Binnie JJ).  See also 
above n 42-51 and accompanying text. 
